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GENRES OF THE SUBLIME: BYRONIC TRAGEDY, MANFRED, 
AND “THE ALPINE JOURNAL” IN THE LIGHT OF SOME 
EUROPEAN CONTEMPORARIES 
 
Ian Balfour 
York University 
Canada 
 
Résumé 
Cet article aborde un aspect négligé des écrits sur le 
sublime : celui du genre. Je ferai valoir que les critiques 
abordent trop souvent le sublime comme s’il opérait 
transcendentalement par rapport à ses instantiations, 
cherchant peu à comprendre comment le mode du sublime 
s’agence avec les genres à l’intérieur desquels il est encodé.  
Quand Byron gravite vers le sublime, il a tendance à le 
faire dans le mode tragique. Les prédicats traditionnels de la 
sublimité (l’infinité, l’obscurité, l’ineffable, etc.) s’appliquent 
bien à des œuvres comme celle de Manfred, la réécriture 
chargée du Faust de Goethe, dans laquelle rien de moins 
sinistre n’est présenté dans la forme d’un personnage 
dramatique. Dans cet article, je situerai les réussites de Byron 
en tragédie par rapport à celles de ses contemporains 
européens. Celles-ci seront également examinées à la lumière 
de réflexions sur la tragédie et le sublime des idéalistes 
allemands. 
 
Anyone writing on the sublime has the at least faintly paradoxical task 
of trying to be clear about something that, by definition, is not. Obscure, 
infinite, boundless, unfathomable, un-imaginable, incomprehensible: these 
are some of recurrent predicates of the sublime. The hermeneutic task, 
Schleiermacher used to say, is an infinite one but somehow in matters of 
the sublime it seems a little more infinite. Yet despite the elusive character 
of the subject matter, there is a good deal to be learned by attending to the 
complexities and specificities of the discourses of the sublime, especially 
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in the Romantic era that was the highpoint of its theory and one of the 
highpoints of its practice. Recent decades, especially the 1980s, have seen 
an especially vigorous and rigorous series of studies of the sublime. In the 
context of the poststructuralist critique of representation generally — led 
variously by Derrida and Foucault and sometimes stretching back to 
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics — it made sense that many critics 
and thinkers would return to one of the very few times and places in the 
history of philosophy where the limits of representation were most 
resolutely confronted: namely, in the thinking of the sublime in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.1 In principle, the sublime is a 
trans-historical phenomenon but we know that the fate of the sublime as 
conceptualized and the fate of the theory of the sublime are far less trans-
historical: the word and the concept and perhaps even the practice of the 
sublime have their appearances and disappearances. And even when we 
do agree on its “appearance,” we are not necessarily all on the same page 
as to how or even if the term sublime should be used. In his Aesthetic 
Theory, Adorno advised abandoning the category as too hopelessly 
embedded in a certain piety of culture as Ersatz religion, whereas Lyotard 
proposes the sublime as the dominant category of artistic practice in the 
twentieth century and hence indispensable. And in this broad spectrum 
from all (Lyotard) to next to nothing (Adorno), there is a wide range of 
positions as to when and how the concept should be invoked.  
Still, in the grand outlines of this thinking and even in its recent 
reception, the profile of the sublime may still be reasonably clear: it tends 
to entail a perceptual overwhelming of the subject in the face of an 
awesome object of nature or a work of art. The subject is, as a result, 
unable to represent properly the object or event that is the impetus for this 
odd sort of experience, an experience attractive and repulsive at one and 
the same time, producing, as Kant says, “negative pleasure,” negative 
Lust.2 Typically the imagination, which Kant calls the faculty of 
representation, the Darstellungsvermögen, fails and the subject is left, at 
least temporarily, tongue-tied or worse, prey to a kind of figurative death, 
a “blockage of the vital forces” (Hemmung der Lebenskräfte), to invoke 
another key phrase of Kant’s (Paragraph 23).  
But almost as soon as we get beyond the basics of the sublime 
situation, and perhaps even before we do, differences emerge. Different 
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poets, artists, and thinkers, implicitly or explicitly, foreground certain 
kinds of sublime experience over others or they construct narratives, and 
different sorts of narratives, to deal with, if not quite to represent as such, 
the occasions for sublime experience. Thus Burke will stress the element 
of terror as constitutive of the phenomenon and Longinus will foreground, 
especially by way of his examples, the dynamic of the self going out of 
itself. Kant emphasizes how the very failure of the imagination in the face 
of the sublime will prompt that faculty of mind to sacrifice itself — that’s 
his term — to sacrifice itself to reason, a move which snatches victory 
from the jaws of defeat and, for the program of critical philosophy, 
constitutes a most crucial articulation between the faculties of imagination 
and reason, without which the entire system of the three critiques would 
lack a final articulation.3 Even this most minimal Kantian story points us 
to a interesting dialectic or maybe just tension between the isolated 
moment, on the one hand, and the encompassing narrative, on the other, 
that has consequences for how we might think the sublime, not least in 
relation to genre. My hunch is that we have for too long operated as if the 
sublime operated transcendentally, as it were, that is, always somehow 
working the same way regardless of the kind of text it may inhabit or 
inform. Even if there is, at a certain level of abstraction, a certain 
homogeneity of the sublime within the horizon of its various 
theorizations, can we really say that the sublime works in the same 
manner in an epic as in a Gothic novel, the same way in an ode as in a 
tragedy? Certainly the history of criticism suggests that not every genre 
lends itself equally well as a possible vehicle of the sublime. But even 
some of the counter-intuitive kinds of genres have been perfectly good 
media for the sublime mode.4 Still, it’s hard to imagine quite how, say, — 
and this is an example that now brings us close to Byron — satire very 
readily could be conducted in a sublime mode, excepting that a certain 
virtuosity in any genre has at least a little something sublime about it, 
rather in the way that Byron in a letter to Douglas Kinnaird writes: “As to 
Don Juan confess — you dog and be candid — that it is the sublime of 
that there sort of writing” (Marchand 315). In judgments of satirical 
writing as sublime, I would suggest we are often talking about the author 
rather than the text or, not quite as problematic, the performance of the 
text rather than its matter or, better still, the dialectical relation between 
matter and performance. The virtuosity of Don Juan is in some sense 
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sublime without the poem itself quite being of the order of the sublime. 
Auden claimed that Byron’s characteristic mode was comic not satirical 
(xi). But Auden’s definition of satire is rather restrictive, entailing a 
necessary hope for reform, whereas Byron, it seems to me, was quite 
happy to satirize regardless of anyone’s possible reform being on the 
horizon. Indeed, reform would have left him bereft of targets. 
Of the major English Romantics Byron has been the least discussed in 
terms of the sublime. Virtually all of the rest have had full monographs 
devoted to them: Wordsworth and the Sublime, Keats and the Sublime, 
and so on. There’s little doubt that Lord Byron cut a sublime figure in 
European culture while alive and for a long time after. The very phrase 
“Byronic hero” seems to have as much to do with Byron as with the 
heroes of his texts, even if the distinction between Byron and his heroes is 
hard to maintain and sometimes downright impossible. If Byron is 
relatively un-discussed in terms of the sublime that has, I think, a good 
deal to do with the primacy of what I would still call satire — not least in 
the original sense of “mixed bag” — throughout his work and in his 
masterpiece Don Juan. In short, it is the Popean legacy. (Not that Pope 
was not also the translator of The Iliad, which constituted for Longinus 
the first great example of the sublime, after which everything has been 
more or less downhill.5 ) But satire is far from the whole story in Byron. 
So where should we turn to locate the sublime in his work?  
We might think in terms of sublime figures or personages, Prometheus 
or Napoleon, say, or in terms of materials, that is, some kinds of content 
over others, or in the domain that will concern me most, certain genres 
where the sublime may flourish. But before turning to genre, we might 
dwell for a moment on the matter of materials. It seems to me that a good 
deal of the sublimity in Byron is determined — perhaps a little 
surprisingly given Byron’s attitude to religion — by the presence of 
Biblical materials, primarily from the Hebrew Scriptures, or what so often 
used to be called the “Old Testament.” We know that even from a tender 
age the Old Testament gave Byron pleasure, whereas the New Testament 
was felt to be a task (Marchand 14). In the domain of Byron’s texts that 
engage Biblical sources, Cain is perhaps the best example, but not to the 
exclusion of Manfred or even the Hebrew Melodies. And we know that 
Byron contemplated writing a work in imitation of the Book of Job but 
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shrank back from it, defeated by what he thought of as the incomparable 
example of the poetic sublime.6 It is good to recall that the Hebrew 
Scriptures were considered by many, for better or worse, an “Oriental” 
text, thus significantly removed from Byron in time and space. Even just 
the antiquity of the ancient Hebrew Scriptures helped to create an aura of 
sublimity — antiquity being a possible but not sufficient quality for the 
sublime in Burke. But it also mattered that the status and integrity of the 
individual subject, if the term is not too anachronistic in the Hebrew 
Scriptures, was so often precarious — so often verging on nothing. This is 
an aspect Hegel stresses in his decidedly idiosyncratic analysis of the 
sublime, which circumscribes the sublime in the strict sense to ancient 
Biblical poetry and, in the strictest sense — which is also the negative 
sense — to the Davidic Psalms, in which nothing so much is proclaimed 
as the nothingness of human existence in relation to the divine. For this 
strain of the sublime, Byron and his contemporaries were directly or 
indirectly indebted to Robert Lowth’s Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of 
the Hebrews delivered at Oxford in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
The modern reception of Lowth suggests that his principal contribution 
was the theory of parallelism, proving that Hebrew poetry was actually 
poetry, but in fact a good deal more of the time and space in the lectures 
was devoted to the sublime. Here attention was accorded to the highly 
figurative and, with respect to the deity, necessarily negative language 
enlisted to represent him, all the time knowing full well that God could 
not really be represented. This sort of the sublime is a kind of discursive 
correlative of the Hebraic prohibition against images, which would be so 
crucial a hallmark of the sublime for Kant and many of his 
contemporaries. It is also in keeping with Hegel’s discussion of the 
sublime as purely a matter of the word, and pre-eminently of the Hebraic, 
poetic word. It also helps explain why, despite the sometimes more or less 
overt anti-Semitism in Kant and to a lesser extent Hegel, these thinkers 
could return, with some respect and sympathy even, to ancient Judaic 
models as premiere examples of the sublime. Protestant iconoclasm vaults 
over the centuries of Catholic benightedness — I’m ventriloquizing here 
— to return to the Judaic resistance to the image with which is has a 
strong affinity. (I note in passing that Byron has some caustic things to 
say about the prohibition against images, claiming it was rooted in God’s 
jealousy, who feared that the perfection of the human form attainable in 
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sculpture constituted an annoying threat to his sovereignty in that 
domain.7) Edmund Burke, even though he may well have been a crypto-
Catholic, also promoted words over images as vehicles of the sublime, for 
their relative indeterminacy and for the powerful possibilities of the 
“assemblage” of words, as he phrases it, superb examples of which were 
to be found in Milton’s inventive syntax. In this he follows Longinus who 
had implicitly promoted hyperbaton — or inversion — as the 
paradigmatic figure of the sublime, which is to say, a literary figure that 
cannot easily be understood in terms of representation, understood 
phenomenally. It somehow fits perfectly that the two poets quoted most 
often by Burke — Milton and Homer — were blind. 
By invoking the word and syntax we are moving closer to the matter of 
form, since materials cannot quite of their own accord constitute the 
sublime. Even the fiat lux, God’s inaugural “let there be light,” Boileau 
suggests, would fall flat if it were expressed in a periphrastic or long-
winded fashion. As has become proverbial, from the sublime to the 
ridiculous there is only a step. Thus formal and generic matters have to be 
taken into account and I would suggest that in Byron the primary locus of 
the sublime is in tragedy or, perhaps more precisely, something very close 
to tragedy. Quasi-tragedies, so to speak. 
Walter Benjamin, in his Trauerspiel book, claimed that “a major work 
will either establish the genre or abolish it; and the perfect work will do 
both.” This is tantamount to saying that perfectly achieved works are in 
some sense utterly singular, even singular in their relation to the genre or 
genres proximate to them. In some of the remarkable examples of 
Romantic tragedy or quasi-tragedy we confront the paradoxical situation 
of a genre with only one example, as Schelling claimed was the case with 
Dante’s Divine Comedy, which counted, for so many of the German 
Romantics as the inaugural work of “modern” literature. In this light, the 
principal text by Byron that I shall address is Manfred but largely in the 
mode of using it, despite its singularity, as a point of departure for 
thinking about any number of texts. 
We know that Byron had a vexed relation to the stage. On the one 
hand, there was his active involvement in Drury Lane, with a vested 
interest in what was to be presented to the public and on the other hand, 
there was his professed horror of the stage — horror is Byron’s word — 
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such that his dramatic works that had, from the outset, and for varying 
over-determined reasons, little or no chance of being performed (BLJ 5: 
185). David Erdman has suggestively charted this dynamic in Byron in 
the context of the period’s anti-theatricalism, a movement well analyzed 
more generally by Julie Carlson and Alan Richardson among others, a 
movement whose most notorious document is usually thought to be 
Lamb’s essay claiming Shakespeare’s plays were “least calculated” for 
the stage.8 It is perhaps more accurate to think of Lamb’s provocative 
essay less as anti-theatrical than as entailing a recognition of how the 
particular sublimity of the great Shakespearean tragedies could not be 
contained by the stage. Lamb has relatively little to say against theatre per 
se, aside from some not so controversial hesitations about the constraints 
of spectacle and the spectacular. In this, he is not so far removed from 
Aristotle, given the philosopher’s marked preference for idea or thought 
(dianoia) over spectacle (opsis). But Lamb’s commentary does move us in 
the direction of a certain kind of drama, very close to Byron’s famous 
notion of “mental theatre”. Lamb remarks: 
To know the internal workings and movements of 
a great mind, of an Othello or a Hamlet for 
instance, the when and the why and the how far 
they should be moved; to what pitch a passion is 
becoming; to give the reins and to pull in the curb 
exactly at the moment when the drawing in or the 
slackening is most graceful; seems to demand a 
reach of intellect of a vastly different extent from 
that which is employed upon the bare imitation of 
the signs of those passions in the countenance or 
gesture, which signs are usually observed to be 
most lively and emphatic in the weaker sort of 
minds . . . . (Lamb 86)  
Whereas here Lamb’s emphasis is on the limitations of actors in their 
attempts to present Shakespeare effectively, it is clear that the principal 
object of his concern is with a certain interiority of the Shakespearean 
hero, with a kind of mental theatre avant la lettre. Theatrical performance 
tends not only to do little to help get this interiority across: it rather 
impedes its communication. Hence the superiority of reading Shakespeare 
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and his main characters’ characters, which are less written in their faces 
than buried in their thoughts and encrypted in their words. 
Missing from Erdman’s perspicacious account — and Lamb’s essay 
helps draw our attention to this — is some sense of the operations of what 
Harold Bloom called “the anxiety of influence” and Walter Jackson Bate 
“the burden of the past,” that is to say, the network of forces having to do 
with the haunting and often debilitating models of the great exemplars of 
the past that impede creation as much as they inspire it. Virtually all of the 
major Romantic writers, including the Big Six, variously wanted to be a 
kind of Shakespeare born again, that is to say, a successful writer for the 
stage who sacrificed nothing in poetical complexity. These forces 
weighed on Byron, even if he sometimes eschewed the increasingly 
widespread lionization of Shakespeare in his time.  
None of the major Romantic poets wrote more than the occasional play 
that was either good or successful or, even more rarely, both: one thinks 
of Shelley’s The Cenci or perhaps Coleridge’s Remorse but not much else. 
It might be said that Joanna Baillie was the only British writer of the time 
to write more than the odd tragedy that was both aesthetically meritorious 
and viable for the stage. And to make matters worse, there was also 
something like a burden of the present, in the example of the successful 
German dramatic writers of the day: Goethe and Schiller, above all.9 Even 
Kotzbue — and this was a galling fact — was infinitely more successful 
than any of the great English Romantics. And yet, despite or because of 
these models of dramatic and sometimes theatrical excellence, past and 
present, Byron devoted a great deal of his poetic energy (which was, 
admittedly, not a huge fraction of his formidable energy in general) to 
dramas or, what is not necessarily the same thing, dramatic poems.  
In this light, I want to offer less a detailed reading of any Byron text 
than to present a framework or frameworks that might assist us in thinking 
about a number of texts by Byron and in Romanticism more generally. 
For the purposes of exposition I shall take Manfred as a point of departure 
— but really a departure — for thinking about the sublime in and in 
relation to the tangled matter of genre, with a focus on tragedy but using 
as well Byron’s “Alpine Journal” as a kind of foil. 
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From the very outset of its critical reception, Manfred was clearly 
recognized as moving in the mode of the sublime. As Francis Jeffrey 
wrote in his account of the text (and it was a text, not a performance): 
He contemplated but a dim and magnificent sketch 
which did not admit of more accurate drawing, or 
more brilliant colouring. Its obscurity is a part of 
its grandeur, and the darkness that rests upon it, 
and the smoky distance in which it is lost, are all 
devices to increase its majesty, to stimulate our 
curiosity, and to impress us with deeper awe. (qtd. 
in Rutherford 117) 
This is by no means always the judgment rendered on Manfred: Jeffrey 
himself undercuts this verdict elsewhere in his review, though his more 
negative comments are a far cry from Auden’s dictum that “the play is 
dead and a big bore” (ix). Yet the drama still has its defenders today: 
Michael Foot calls it, rather more analytically, “a serious poem on a 
tremendous theme” (190).  
Byron himself used the word “metaphysical” to characterize his 
Manfred and the term certainly points to the peculiarly intellectual or 
conceptual character of the work, called a dramatic poem. The unusual 
classification perhaps derives from Samson Agonistes with which it bears 
some similarities, though for Milton such a classification was not opposed 
to tragedy. In principle, a metaphysical drama could take place anywhere, 
but Byron chooses to double-code it as sublime by setting his lofty 
intellectual drama in the most textbook locus for this aesthetic mode: the 
Alps. (This is a setting only to be outdone, in terms of the sublime, by act 
2 of Cain being located in “The Abyss of Space.” How would one stage 
that?) Byron’s “Alpine Journal” of 1816 furnishes one striking entry into 
this material and it is also of interest not least because the journey was one 
of the sources for Manfred. But it also provides a very different sort of 
writing exactly where some of the concerns are the same.  
Byron’s account of his travels in the Alps begins unprepossessingly 
enough. Mont Blanc first appears only between two blanks, two dashes: 
“weather very fine — the Lake calm and clear — Mont Blanc — and the 
Aiguille of Argentière both very distinct …” (BLJ 5: 96). But we are soon 
treated to more traditionally sublime discourse, and this time in a way that 
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inscribes gender distinctions aligned with the beautiful and the sublime 
that had started to harden more than a half-century before. In a passage 
very like Coleridge’s account of a young lady’s aesthetic gaffe at the Falls 
of Clyde, when she called the Falls “pretty” instead of “sublime” (thus 
forming part of a tradition in which men teach women the difference 
between the sublime and the beautiful, which also happens to be bound 
up, for Kant, Burke, and others, in the putative differences between men 
and women), Byron notes:  
On our return met an English party in a carriage — 
a lady in it fast asleep in the most anti-narcotic spot 
in the world — excellent — I remember at 
Chamouni — in the very eyes of Mont Blanc — 
hearing another woman — English also — claim to 
her party —“did you ever see anything more rural” 
— as if it was Highgate or Hampstead-or 
Brompton-or Hayes. — “Rural quotha — Rocks 
— pines — torrents — Glaciers — Clouds — and 
Summits of eternal snow far above them — and 
“Rural!” I did not know the thus exclaiming fair 
one — but she was a — very good kind of 
woman.” (97)10 
Without expressly saying so, Byron is lambasting members of the fair 
sex — and the appellation is already a sign of the problem — either for 
having no feeling for the sublime (sleeping right through it) or for 
confusing the sublime with the merely rural, and this in perhaps the most 
clichéd locus of the sublime, period. No site was more de rigueur for 
Romantic poets, even and perhaps especially the British. Shelley duly 
wrote his “Mont Blanc” and Wordsworth’s sublime encounter in the Alps 
forms arguably the high point, literally and otherwise, of The Prelude. 
And when Coleridge couldn’t see the sights or sites in person as the 
occasion for writing a poem, he simply borrowed, to put it kindly, from a 
German woman poet the basis for his “Hymn Before Sunrise in the Vale 
of Chamounix.”  
In Byron’s “Alpine Journal” his telegraphic notation — with its 
plethora of paratactic dashes — is well suited to the discontinuous, 
rupturing mode of the sublime. Such syntax is all the more crucial to the 
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description of the Jungfrau — which, when Byron (anticipating Manfred 
precisely) is striving to forget himself and his relations to a certain young 
woman, is not just any name for a mountain — the mountain that will 
reappear in Manfred:  
at the Curate’s — set out to see the Valley — 
heard an Avalanche fall — like thunder Arrived at 
the foot of the Mountain (the Yung-frau. i.e. the 
Maiden) — Glaciers — torrents — one of these 
torrents nine hundred feet in height of visible 
descent-lodge — saw Glacier — enormous — 
Storm came on — thunder — lightning — hail! — 
in all perfection — and beautiful . . . . 
A little further on, Byron continues: 
the torrent is in shape curving over the rock — like 
the tail of a white horse streaming in the wind — 
such as might be conceived would be that of the 
“pale horse” on which Death is mounted in the 
Apocalypse. — It is neither mist nor water but 
something between both — it’s [sic] immense 
height (nine hundred feet) gives it a wave — a 
curve — a spreading here — a condensation there 
— wonderful — & indescribable. (101) 
This is classic testimony to the workings of the sublime, culminating in 
a verbal throwing up of the hands, as if the scene successfully resists 
translation into words. The reader of Manfred will have noticed how some 
of the phrases appearing in the play are taken almost verbatim from the 
journal, such as the observation on the pale horse of Death. That phrase is 
an interesting counter-example to the rule in this prose effusion, in being 
longer and less interrupted than the surrounding prose, all of it choppy. It 
is perhaps this coherence that makes it particularly fitting for the far more 
regular syntax of the drama or dramatic poem.11 But is the sublime in this 
scene, however variously rendered into prose, really having its desired 
effect? Having just noted that he has “seen some of the noblest views in 
the world,” Byron goes on to say: 
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But in all this — the recollection of bitterness — & 
more especially of recent & more home desolation 
— which must accompany me through life — have 
preyed upon me here — and neither the music of 
the Shepherd — the crashing of the Avalanche — 
nor the Cloud — have for one Moment — 
lightened the weight upon my heart — nor enabled 
me to lose my own wretched identity in the 
majesty and the Glory — around — above — & 
beneath me. (104-5) 
Here there is no experiential equivalent of the loss of self, of the ek-
stasis, the characteristic effect of the rhetorical sublime in Longinus. 
Geoffrey Hartman long ago outlined the pervasive pre-occupation of 
European Romanticism with anti-self-consciousness, from Keats’ envy of 
the nightingale’s unpremeditated verse to Kleist’s fascination with 
marionettes.12 But surely Byron’s exposition of the desire for anti-self 
consciousness in Manfred, the play and the character, is one of the most 
extreme versions of it. “Oblivion” and “self-oblivion” are Manfred’s 
explicit goals in the play bearing his name. On the scale of ways to 
obliterate consciousness, drowning one’s sorrows or dulling one’s pains 
with wine or opium hardly stack up against Manfred’s desire for oblivion, 
which includes, for him, the tempting possibility of suicide. 
The dynamic at the core of Manfred is the assertion of the titular 
hero’s will. Assertions of will are familiar in tragedy and are arguably an 
indispensable characteristic of the tragic hero. But this assertion takes a 
peculiar form in Manfred. Manfred’s titanic assertion of will is less given 
over to action than even, say, the overly reflective “actions” of a Hamlet 
or an Oedipus, much less the more stereotypical heroes of tragedy.13 
Moreover, it is not as if there is a singular, dominant force or character 
opposing the hero of Manfred. To be sure, there are the “Destinies” and 
their ringleader “Nemesis” but even these formidable figures appear rather 
in the mode of momentary obstacles than that of substantial antagonists. 
We shall return later to discuss, from another angle, the dynamics of 
sequence in Manfred but before doing so we might entertain one further 
stumbling block built into Byron’s drama. 
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The not necessarily so dramatic matter of oblivion in Manfred is 
coupled with another not so auspicious problematic for the stage, namely: 
the unspeakable. Often some key issue at the core of the psychic history 
of a tragic or quasi-tragic protagonist resists being clearly enunciated as 
such. Reviewing the history of the tragedy, one finds that there is a 
surprisingly good deal of talk about the unspeakable, from Oedipus Rex to 
Phèdre to The Cenci. And often the name of the unspeakable is incest. 
The absence creates a secret at the heart of the tragedy and places an extra 
burden on language as the medium for the action, which in these texts 
often seems somewhat lacking in action as traditionally conceived. For 
reasons of propriety, generic or otherwise, the matter of incest — based, 
as almost every critic notes on Byron’s own fraught history — is only 
“insinuated,” as Francis Jeffrey termed it in his review of the play. But the 
strong suggestion is there (“we loved each other as we should not love”) 
and the idea is just as strong, if not more so, for being there in the mode of 
suggestion.  
This emphasis on thought, even in the negative mode of thinking of 
self-annihilation, is less out of place in tragedy than in a good many 
genres and it is one aspect of the genre that helps account among the 
hierarchies of genre for its almost systematic privileging by philosophers 
from Aristotle through Hegel to Nietzsche and beyond. Peter Szondi, in 
his stimulating study On the Tragic, suggests that it is really only in the 
era of German Idealism that one for the first time encounters philosophies 
of tragedy rather than accounts of tragedy issuing from philosophers.14 
One concern of this ferment of thinking on the sublime was the sense, in 
Schelling and August Wilhelm Schlegel, that tragedy was the most 
comprehensive of the genres, as the synthesis of epic and lyric and as such 
lent itself more to the sublime than any other. Schelling goes on to 
contend that the subject — that is, the protagonist — of tragedy as subject 
cannot experience the infinite as infinite, even if the infinite is an idea that 
hovers more or less constantly over so many tragedies. This simultaneous 
necessity and impossibility of experiencing the infinite, all the while in 
the mode of finitude, helps produce the allegorical character of a good 
many tragedies, including, say, the allegorical extravagance of Goethe’s 
Faust and Byron’s Manfred. 
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One might expect that it would be to Hegel to whom one could look 
for a theory of tragedy as sublime, given the lofty status he assigns it in 
his Aesthetics and given, for example, the philosophical dignity he 
ascribes to Antigone, making it the very model for the dialectics of ethical 
life as expounded in The Phenomenology of Spirit. But strictly speaking, 
for Hegel, there is, in principle, nothing in classical art (which 
corresponds essentially to ancient Greek art) that is sublime. In Hegel’s 
tri-partite division of the arts in historical terms into the symbolic, the 
classic, and the romantic, the sublime inhabits only symbolic art, which is 
to say, more or less ancient Eastern (or Oriental) and Middle Eastern art. 
This is art which is not really even art but rather “pre-art,” as Hegel calls 
it. It is termed “pre-art,” because it is not characterized by the 
interpenetration of meaning (Bedeutung) and form (Gestalt) that is 
definitive of all art in the first place. As mentioned previously, Hegel, 
unlike any of his contemporaries, confines the sublime in the strict sense 
to ancient Biblical poetry and then allows for a few epigonal formations 
as in Christian mysticism and what he calls Mohammedan poetry. So for a 
“Hegelian” account of tragedy as sublime we can turn instead to Hegel’s 
disciple, Friedrich Theodor Vischer, who in 1837 published a fascinating 
treatise called On the Sublime and the Comic, at a time when only the first 
part of Hegel’s lectures on Aesthetics had been published, thus lacking the 
analysis of comedy and tragedy that would eventually be the very final 
topic or culmination of Hegel’s text.15 Vischer follows Hegel in many 
things but departs from him, at least at the level of the letter, in the 
analysis of the sublime. 
For Vischer sublimity is not the opposite of the beautiful, as, say for 
Burke, or for Schelling: it proceeds from beauty. Vischer posits two kinds 
of sublimity: the sublimity of nature (or what he also calls substance) and 
the sublimity of the subject. One of the intriguing features of texts on the 
theory of the sublime is the status of examples in them; and what is 
striking in Vischer is the extent to which, even more Hegelian than Hegel, 
he so resolutely promotes, by example but also in principle, tragedy over 
all genres. Through the course of the analyses of both sublimes, of nature 
and of “the subject,” it is already remarkable how prominently tragedy 
figures as the main source of examples before tragedy emerges explicitly 
as the synthesizing category that reconciles and raises to a higher level 
both nature and the subject now in the heady domain of the absolute. 
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Vischer’s curious invocation of a scene from Goethe’s Faust — a play 
even in its earliest published form recognized by Schelling as “the 
absolute philosophical tragedy” — gets us back reasonably close to 
Byron’s Manfred, for it is in the invocation of spirits by a solitary man 
disenchanted with “philosophy and science” that Byron’s poetic drama 
most resembles Faust. Even though our sense of the precise extent of 
Byron’s knowledge of Faust will forever remain up in the air, we do 
know Matthew “Monk” Lewis read at least some scenes to Byron in the 
fabled year of 1816 and he may well have absorbed some of the charged 
snippets of the play via Madame de Stael’s discussion and partial 
translation in her path-breaking study De l’Allemagne.16 Goethe, only a 
little narcissistically, thought Manfred an admirable “version” or 
appropriation of his Faust. Byron, predictably and with some justification, 
downplayed the comparisons. But there is little denying the clear affinities 
with Goethe’s Faust in the opening scene, featuring the hero’s inaugural 
monologue and his chanting invocation of the spirits, especially the spirit 
of the earth. 
This scene with the Erdgeist or “Spirit of the Earth,” was, even among 
Goethe’s rough contemporaries, singled out as particularly sublime, not 
just because the spirit is addressed by Faust explicitly as “erhabener 
Geist.” Faust summons up no less than the spirit of the earth, the earth 
personified, and despite the struggle of forces, arguably gains the upper 
hand (not unlike the way Byron’s Manfred achieves superiority over the 
cosmic forces he summons up). Vischer is one of the critics who seizes on 
Goethe’s scene as paradigmatically sublime, but does so partly with a 
striking blindness, as he offers it as an example of the natural sublime, 
forgetting somehow, that we are not dealing with the earth as such but the 
spirit of the earth, and not the spirit of the earth as such but the text of the 
spirit of the earth.  
It is one thing to talk about the “microcosmos” or the earth in general 
and quite another thing to represent those forces as if embodied in single 
characters. These are situations which strain the possibilities of 
representation, especially for a work conceived for the stage or modeled 
on a work for the stage, and contribute to the allegorical texture of these 
tragedies, which may not, after all, be such pure tragedies. It is clear from 
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Goethe’s early notes to Faust that an express concern with the sublime 
was essential to the project. The notes read, from the beginning: 
Ideal striving to achieve an influence upon and a felling for the whole 
of Nature 
The appearance of the Spirit as Genius of the World and of Action 
Conflict between Form and the Formless 
Preference for formless content over empty form17 
For this scene a drawing by Goethe survives, outlining how he 
envisaged it, namely, with the face of the Erdgeist — Manfred too is 
concerned to see spirits, as Moses wanted to see God, “face to face” — 
floating huge and disembodied high above the mortal Faust on the stage, 
rather like the scene in The Wizard of Oz in which the wizard’s visage is 
projected in front of the cowering Dorothy and friends, prior to his 
unmasking by Toto. Needless to say, this is easier done in film than on the 
stage. 
The affinities with Manfred’s invocations of a procession of spirits, the 
texture of which curiously anticipates that of Faust II, which Byron could 
almost certainly not have known, are clear. The stately and strangely static 
procession, if that is not a contradiction in terms, does seem to recall 
Marlovian tragedy more than Shakespearean, and not just Doctor Faustus 
but Tamburlaine as well, whose numerous opponents correspond to the 
panoply of spirits and dead people conjured by Faustus.18 It is a kind of 
drama that, given its relative paucity of action (“no action, no plot, no 
characters,” according to Francis Jeffrey!), throws a greater emphasis on 
the word and in this too Byron’s grandiloquence in Manfred seems closer 
to Marlowe than to Shakespeare. (Like Goethe, Byron, in composing the 
speeches of the spirits, conspicuously varied the rhyme, rhythm, and 
length of line from one speech to the next, trying to break what otherwise 
risked being a monotonous sameness.) But unlike Faust’s quest for 
knowledge, pleasure, and power, played out in a relentless movement 
aspiring to totality and infinity, a kind of dramatic parallel to the odyssey 
of the subject in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Manfred abjures all the 
powers offered him and desires instead, as we have seen, the sheer 
oblivion that would come with the loss of life. Still, the structure of a 
tormented soul face to face with other-worldly spirits has more than a 
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family resemblance with Goethe’s unconventional tragedy. We shall 
return to this aspect, partly the “metaphysical” aspect of Byron’s “mad” 
drama, from one last perspective. 
Yet before turning to that, I want to note how the sublime, in literature, 
can never be simply a matter or topic or even structure. The language too 
must rise to the level of the sublime, as dictated already by the ancient 
strictures of the (usually three) levels of style, with the sublime always 
associated with “grand” or “high” style. Byron is eminently capable of 
mastering this high style, and even of ratcheting things up a notch. An 
instance from Cain may serve to illustrate what I have in mind. When 
Cain, in act 2, Scene 1, is shown the awesome splendours of the universe 
in the “abyss of space,” he exclaims: 
Oh, thou beautiful 
And unimaginable ether! and 
Ye multiplying masses of increased 
And still-increasing lights! what are ye? what  
Is this blue wilderness of interminable 
Air, where ye roll along, as I have seen 
The leaves along the limpid streams of Eden? 
Is your course measured for ye? Or do ye 
Sweep on in your unbounded revelry 
Through an aerial universe of endless 
Expansion, at which my soul aches to think,  
Intoxicated with eternity?  
(CPW 6. 255, lines 98-109) 
Despite beginning by sounding the idea of the beautiful, the passage 
soon shifts to the modality of the sublime, and not just in any way, not just 
by enlisting some of the standard predicates of the sublime 
(“unimaginable,” “unbounded,” etc.) Byron’s control of the verse line 
here is sovereign, as witnessed by the striking use of enjambment, most 
particularly by repeatedly ending the line in the middle of a pregnant 
phrase, temporarily suspending things at the end of the line with an 
adjective thematically linked with precisely the lack of ending. This is the 
function of in the words “interminable” and “endless,” very much in the 
way Wordsworth will leave a line hanging with the word “hang.” 
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Terminating with “interminable” and ending with “endless” underscore 
the “presence” of the infinite by performing and thematizing a small 
version of it in the drama of the line. 
One final angle of approach in my long circumscription of the matter 
of tragedy or quasi-tragedy and the sublime in Byron, Manfred and 
beyond, is afforded by Schiller, who is in the unusual position of being a 
successful dramatist on the one hand and a powerful theorist and critic of 
tragedy and the sublime, on the other. It is Schiller’s insistence on the 
centrality of freedom that seems to resonate so well with Byron. The 
sublime is not at all self-evidently, in the first instance, a matter of 
freedom. To judge from Longinus, Burke, or to a lesser extent, Kant and 
Hegel, one is close to the opposite of free in the moment of the sublime. 
Typically in the sublime, one is at least temporarily overwhelmed, cast out 
of oneself, disoriented, un-comprehending, astonished, or figuratively 
dead. Yet Schiller’s principal essay on the sublime begins by quoting the 
famous dictum spoken by the titular hero (a Jew) of Lessing’s Nathan The 
Wise “No human being must ‘must’.” Kein Mensch muss müssen.” 
Schiller’s virtual obsession with the literal primacy of freedom constitutes 
a somewhat singular position on the spectrum of theories of the sublime, 
even if he, like so many of his contemporaries, insists on the affinity of 
tragedy with the sublime. Schiller maintains that “the ultimate goal of the 
work of art is the representation of the super-sensuous (die Darstellung 
des Übersinnlichen) and that it is especially tragic art that accomplishes 
this.19 The very definition of art here displays how massively the presence 
of the category of the sublime had changed the basic conception of the 
aesthetic in general. For a few thousand years or so the aesthetic had been 
essentially coterminous with the beautiful and it tended to be thought 
through categories such as harmony, symmetry, proportion, and 
intelligibility. But with the re-discovery of Longinus’ treatise on the 
sublime in the late seventeenth century, principally via Boileau, a new 
discourse arose which would by the middle of the eighteenth century, 
especially with Burke and the early Kant, completely reshape how one 
divided up the terrain of the aesthetic: namely into the opposed categories 
of the beautiful and the sublime. Schelling would call the relation between 
the two a Gegensatz, an opposition. Moreover, in Schelling we can see 
how the presence of the sublime retroactively informs the very definition 
of the beautiful, now for almost the first time conceived also in terms of 
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the infinite. Thus in his Philosophy of Art he determines the sublime as 
the “informing [the Einbildung] of the infinite into the finite” but also the 
beautiful as “the informing of the finite into the infinite.” Rarely had 
anyone ever defined the beautiful in terms so close to those of the 
sublime. 
Sharing this orientation, Schiller will nonetheless put his distinctive 
stamp on the conception of the aesthetic, characterizing art as “Freedom 
in its appearance” (Freiheit in der Erscheinung, in the Kallias Brief of 8 
February, 1793). This virtual obsession with freedom surfaces also in his 
conception of tragedy, even where the odds seems stacked against it, 
given that so many theorists agree on the balance of freedom and 
necessity, being crucial to the mode.  Schelling conceived of the dialectic 
of freedom and necessity as the determining relation constituting the 
sublimity of tragedy, though the thematics of freedom are far from 
constant throughout the genre. It could hardly be said to be the hallmark 
of Shakespearean tragedy, for starters. For his part, Schiller, bucking what 
so many have found to be the dominant Hellenophilia of his time, 
chastised Greek tragedy, precisely for its overemphasis on the pole of 
necessity or fate in tragic plots. 20 
Following Kant, Schiller claims that “in moral sensibilities [but who, 
we might ask, is not or does not have a moral sensibility?] what is 
terrifying in the imagination quickly and easily passes over into the 
sublime. Just as the imagination loses its freedom, so reason makes its 
freedom viable (so macht die Vernunft die ihrige geltend).”21 This 
putatively easy passage from the terrifying (the defining characteristic of 
the sublime for Burke) to the sublime happens only, in Kant and in 
Schiller, when the subject of this experience is safe and secure. Still the 
passage is a little mysterious. In Kant the faculty of imagination is said to 
“sacrifice itself” (aufopfert) to the reason.22 Kant to be sure stresses any 
number of elements of freedom in his analytic of the sublime: the free 
play of the imagination and — despite the aesthetic needing to be 
provisionally cut off from any interest, any judgement that would entail a 
purpose or a sense of what is good — ultimately, if indirectly, the freedom 
of the subject generally to act in a way at least analogous to the moral. For 
Kant, reason has the freedom to think beyond the realm of the senses to 
the domain of the supersensible and the self’s very ability to do so is the 
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index of its superiority to nature, its Übermacht. Schiller too describes the 
dynamic of the sublime as a sequence of Ohnmacht and Übermacht, of 
powerlessness and superiority or dominion, in that order. As in Kant, the 
momentary powerlessness is said to give way to a greater power 
succeeding it but the mechanism whereby this happens is curiously and 
indeed surreptitiously negotiated in Schiller. In the face of the violence or 
power set to overwhelm one, Schiller says: “To negate violence (Gewalt) 
according to the concept means nothing other than to submit to it 
voluntarily (sich derselben freiwillig unterwerfen).23 It is hard to 
exaggerate the oddness or dubious character of this move in Schiller’s 
thinking. How free is the free submission to violence that one cannot 
otherwise escape? 
Be that as it may, there is in Byron’s tragedies, mysteries, and quasi-
tragedies an unusual and not always problematic emphasis on freedom, 
quite like that in Schiller’s tragic theory and practice, as well as in 
Goethe’s Faust. Both Schiller’s and Byron’s dramas are less concerned 
with fate or inevitability than is usually thought, even when the term 
Schicksalsdrama is sometimes applied to the former. Indeed, they feature 
what might be called “evitability,” that is, a sense of contingency and 
possibility that is at least partly a matter of will. Even the most fateful of 
tragedies has to ascribe some agency to its heroes — otherwise, their sorry 
outcomes would be merely unfortunate or at most “sad.” But the Byronic 
tragedies and their German fellow travelers display an unusual emphasis 
on the hero’s ability to direct his fate, the supreme example of which 
might be Manfred’s overcoming of the Spirit at the end of the drama and 
choosing death on his own terms. It certainly enhances the possibilities for 
the exercise of the hero’s freedom if the hero has larger-than-life powers. 
Not even most grand heroes of tragedy are able to summon spirits at their 
spoken or written will. Manfred apostrophizes those spirits with the 
phrase “Mysterious Agency” but his own agency is mysterious in his own 
right, given his ultimately sovereign power over any number of spirits, 
including Nemesis and the “Destinies.”  
Not quite tragic in all its formal properties, Manfred has nonetheless a 
good deal of the aura of a tragedy, not least through a plethora of allusions 
to tragedies, especially to Hamlet but also to King Lear and a good many 
others. And the very name and figure of Nemesis, who appears as such in 
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Manfred, summons up the archetypal figure of fate from Ancient Greek 
tragedy. There is perhaps nothing essentially new under the generic sun 
— certainly that is one of the lessons of Northrop Frye’s thinking on 
genre — but it does seem to me that the works of Byron, Goethe, and 
Schiller, in practice and in sometimes in theory, combine a thematic 
insistence on freedom with a corresponding experimentation in dramatic 
form, especially in their skewing of the conventions of tragedy. This 
results in making their plays, their quasi-tragedies, all the more “singular” 
and all the more sublime. 
Tragedy, however sublime, tends to put the sublime in its place, so to 
speak. There is a powerful drive in tragedy to make sense of everything, if 
only after the fact, at the end of the play or in a “beyond” posited by the 
play. Thus Hamlet is very concerned for Horatio to remain among the 
living so that he can tell the story and there is a strong sense at the end of 
King Lear that to have survived the extremity and even insanity is to have 
made some sense of it all. For Aristotle, what is not of the order of reason, 
what is alogos, should not be represented on stage. That is to say, the 
discursive space of the stage is one of reason, even if one can more or less 
directly confront situations that take us to the limits of reason and in some 
sense, that is, virtually, beyond. Thus the illogicality — the threat to 
reason — of incest is put in its narrative place by the overarching plot. 
Somewhat paradoxically, Byron’s “Alpine Journal,” which only 
undertakes to give an account of what was happening to him on his 
journey through the Alps, emerges as more sublime than Manfred, not 
least because it allows the sublime moment to be just that: a moment. 
Aided by Byron’s ubiquitous dash, the non-totalizable moment of the 
sublime is rendered in a language even more striking than the lofty 
extravagances of Manfred. 
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